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3, 13

ARGUMENT - STIPULATION ISSUES

Respondent's argument on the Stipulation issues is a masterpiece of
misdirection. Early in their Brief, Respondents state "that the crux of the issue is
the meaning of the term 'normalization/ a utility accounting concept, in a
settlement sanctioned by the Public Utility Code." Resp. Brief at 1. Having

correctly stated the issue, Respondents then ignore it, instead raising several
irrelevant factual issues and legal arguments. USWC's Brief, on the other hand,

directly addressed this key issue and demonstrated that the Commission erred in
interpreting the Stipulation to preclude consideration of the normalization issues.
The fundamental issue in this case is fairness. The Stipulation was based

on only six months of test year data. It specifically required that updates be made
to the data and that the updated information be normalized. In the last six
months of 1990, particularly in November and December, several bookings were
made that related to the resolution of prior period tax and accounting issues.i

The net effect of those bookings was to create the appearance of higher test year

earnings, thus making the revenue reduction even greater. As prior cases have
demonstrated, these kinds of bookings could just as easily have gone the other

way.2 Thus, while Respondents question USWC's motives in this case, if the

bookings had gone the other way, there is no question that their interpretation of

i For a description of the nature of the bookings, see USWC's initial Brief
at 14, n. 12.

2

In Docket No. 88-049-07, the net of seven prior period adjustments

lowered the revenue requirement. (R. 8326-28)

In that case, USWC took the

position that all of the bookings should be normalized from the test period to the
benefit of ratepayers. The parties have routinely agreed to and the Commission
has just as routinely made these kinds of adjustments to test periods.
1

the Stipulation would be far different than the interpretation they are arguing for
in this case. USWC's position would not be different than it is arguing here, even
if the bookings had gone the other way.
I.

THE ADDITIONAL FACTUAL ISSUES RAISED BY RESPONDENTIA ARE
MISLEADING AND IRRELEVANT.

In their Statement of Facts section, Respondents make several factual
assertions that are both misleading and irrelevant to the central issues of this
appeal.

A.

Respondents' Motive Claim. Respondents claimed that USWC's

statement of facts was misleading because it "[flails to mention that as actual

figures for the test year became available, USWC was facing an ever increasing
rate reduction, thus providing a motive for its attempt to add $6 million to its
revenue requirement." Resp. Brief at 3. Respondents pointed out that the

expected reduction had increased from $11 million based on 9 months data to $21

million based on 12 months data. Id. at 6. The apparent inference is that USWC
had an improper motive in proposing the normalization adjustments. Motives

are irrelevant. What the data really demonstrates is the profound impact that the
November and December out-of-period bookings had on the test year. The $10
million revenue requirement impact in only three months is a graphic

demonstration of the significant impact that out-of-period bookings, which are
unrelated to current operations, can have on a test period. They also demonstrate

why normalization adjustments should be made: They remove accounting
entries from the test period that are unrelated to normal, ongoing operations.
Unless removed from the test period, such bookings produce results that frustrate

the purpose of a test year, which is to develop financial results "that reasonably
approximate circumstances expected during the period rates will be in effect." In
re Mountain Fuel Supply Co., Docket No. 89-057-15, at 6 (Utah P.S.C, November

21, 1990). USWC's actions were entirely consistent with the Stipulation, which
was to resolve most issues, but leave enough flexibility so that the test year could
be appropriately adjusted to reflect normal, ongoing operations.3

B.

Respondents' Claim Regarding Amount of Updated Test Year Data.

Respondents claim that USWC

[m]isleadingly states that the parties presumed from the beginning that the
Commission's final order would be based on 12 months data (thus

permitting year-end adjustments discretionary with USWC), when in fact
the expectation was that only 11 months of actual data would be available.
Resp. Brief at 4. The significance of this complaint is unclear. It is certainly true
that, pursuant to the hearing schedule at the time the Stipulation was entered,
the parties contemplated that eleven months of data would be available prior to
issuance of the order (R. 4575). At the same time, paragraph 9 of the Stipulation
stated that the final order would be based on a JE-1 that was updated "for at least

11 months actual test year results." Id., emphasis added.

This language

demonstrates that the parties planned to add the final month, if it was available.
Because of a delay in the hearing schedule, 12 months data were available when

3
Respondents' also claimed that USWC had failed "to mention that at
the time the Stipulation was signed, USWC believed that the updates would result
in no huge differences in the final results, while at the time 12 months data were
available, the Company was referring to the profound impact of its newly
proposed adjustments." Resp. Brief at 3-4. The relevancy of this information to
the issues in this appeal is never explained. Obviously, two things were taking

place: (1) improved financial results and (2) several out-of-period bookings that
were unrelated to normal operations were made that increased USWC earnings
in 1990. Clearly, USWC was surprised by the results.
3

the final version of JE-1 was prepared by the Division in April 1991.

The inference in Respondents' statement that the use of 12 months data

somehow permitted USWC to make "discretionary" adjustments is grossly
misleading.4 It implies that the use of 12 month's data was beneficial to USWC.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Updating for 12 months caused USWC

significant harm, because a significant portion of the out-of-period adjustments
were booked in December. Neither of the versions of JE-1 reflecting six and nine
months of data contained these out-of-period adjustments. Because those

bookings increased reported earnings for the test year-even though unrelated to
operations for that year-they caused a larger decrease than otherwise would have
occurred.

C.

Respondents' Discovery Cut-Off Claim. Respondents claim that

USWC failed "to acknowledge that discovery on revenue requirement issues
expressly terminated on November 26, 1990." Resp. Brief at 4. Respondents claim

that the discovery deadline passed and, therefore, they were unable to engage in

additional discovery on "normalization" issues. What Respondents ignore ;.s that

USWC was filing updated financial information each month, and did nothing to

4 The inference that the out-of-period bookings were "discretionary" is both
offensive and unsupported. While the narrative portion of Respondents' brief
states that the bookings were discretionary, footnote 12 demonstrates that
Respondents have no basis for that statement and have contradicted themselves.

In footnote 12, they state that the bookings "may or may not be discretionary."
Respondents' attempt to call into question the integrity of USWC's financial
bookkeeping should be rejected. Nothing in the record indicates that there is such

a thing as a "discretionary" booking or that these bookings were discretionary.
Under generally accepted accounting principles, it is mandatory that accruals

made in prior years be trued up when better information becomes available. That

is precisely what USWC did in this case. Given the Commission's interpretation
of the Stipulation, those bookings caused an additional $6 million rate reduction.
4

prevent the Committee and Division from doing whatever discovery they deemed
necessary to analyze the monthly numbers, since they were to be part of the
updates to JE-1.5 The Division's accounting witness noted that wdth every
monthly update, the Division would "go through them and look for discrepancies

and try to ask questions of the Company." (R. 473) Nothing indicates that USWC
was anything but fully responsive. The emptiness of Respondents' discovery
argument is demonstrated by the fact that, in April 1991, the Committee sent
USWC a detailed set of data requests relating to the normalization adjustments

proposed by USWC. Rather than objecting to the data requests-as Respondents
imply USWC could have done under the discovery cutoff-USWC responded fully to
them within three days. (R. 8324)

The parties had every right to ask questions regarding the financial results
for the last six months of 1990 and to propose normalization adjustments to that
data. The cutoff on revenue requirement data requests in no way precluded

discovery on those issues. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that
USWC interpreted the discovery cutoff in the manner alleged by Respondents.6

5 The Division was certainly operating on the premise that it needed to be
examining the updated financial results to remove abnormal events. See footnote
9, infra.

6 Respondents make a point of the position USWC took with regard to some
discovery relating to contributions USWC made to several charitable
organizations that filed letters in support of USWC's proposed incentive
regulation plan. USWC asserted that that was an issue for which additional
discovery was precluded. The record is clear that the purpose for the data request
was not to seek information regarding revenue requirement but to challenge the

credibility of organizations who had supported USWC's proposed plan.
Furthermore, while USWC objected to the data request, it went ahead and
provided all information requested for 1990. (R. 5327)
5

11.

RESPONDENTS' CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING
OF THE COMMISSION IS RELEVANT IS WITHOUT MERIT.

The Commission ruled that, in interpreting the Stipulation, "all that is

important is what the Commission understood to be stipulated to by the parties at
the time it accepted the Stipulation." (R. 5391) USWC characterized this as a

novel and incorrect theory of contractual interpretation, pointing out that, under

the objective theory of contract interpretation adopted in Utah, a court should give
effect to the intention of the parties based on an examination of the objective
language of the contract. In other words, the objective language prevails ever one
party's subjective intent. USWC's Brief at 39.

Respondents' effort to deflect this argument is even more novel and
incorrect. Respondents' state:

The problem with U S West's analysis is that is [sic] assumes the

Commission, in its quasi-judicial role of interpreting the contract, is acting
precisely the same as a court. In reality, however, the Commission is not
acting only as a decision-maker between opposing parties, but is also
required to decide whether the agreement is in the public interest. In
making that finding, the Commission in a sense becomes a party to the

agreement and its "subjective" understanding of the meaning of the
agreement becomes relevant. See Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-1(1990).

Resp. Brief at 12, n. 23, emphasis added. Respondents obviously do not
understand the objective theory of contract interpretation. Even if one were to

accept the unsupported claim that the Commission somehow became a patty to
the Stipulation,? that still does not give the Commission the power to interpret the
contract on the basis of its subjective view of its meaning. The principle that the

7 Respondents cited no legal authority for the novel proposition that the
Commission, in approving the Stipulation, became a party to it. Resp Brief at 12
n. 23.
6

objective intent of the parties is to be determined based on the language of the
contract still applies. In a case cited by Respondents, this Court made it clear that
the objective intent of the parties is the relevant consideration:

The primary rule in interpreting a contract is to determine what the parties
intended by looking at the entire contract and all of its parts in relation to
each other, giving an objective and reasonable construction to the contract
as a whole.

Sears v. Riemersma. 655 P.2d 1105, 1107-08 (Utah 1982), emphasis added.
III.

RESPONDENTS' CLAIM THAT USWC IS BARRED FROM SEEKING
JUDICIAL REVIEW IS WITHOUT MERIT.

Paragraph 13 of the Stipulation states:

13. Review/Rehearing and Appeal. Nothing in this Stipulation shall bar or
be deemed to bar any party from seeking review and rehearing or judicial
review of any aspect of the Commission's final order in these consolidated
proceedings except with respect to matters expressly agreed to in this
Stipulation.

On the basis of this provision, Respondents conclude that "[i]t is clear that in
executing the Stipulation the parties waived any right to appeal on revenue
requirement issues." Resp. Brief at 16. By implying that every revenue

requirement issue was resolved in the Stipulation, Respondents are clearly
misreading the Stipulation. Even a cursory examination demonstrates that many
issues, including the normalization issues, were not "expressly agreed to" in the
Stipulation.8

Paragraph 13 was not intended to preclude an appeal of the Commission's
decision not to consider the normalization adjustments proposed by USWC. Many

specific issues were agreed to in the Stipulation, while others were not. For

8 The Background section of the Stipulation makes that clear. It stated the
parties "engaged in negotiations to resolve as many revenue requirement issues
as possible." (R. 4568)
7

example, in JE-1 the parties agreed to 32 specific adjustments to the six months of
data available at the time (e.g., Columns 2 through 11 and B through W). (R. 158183) The parties further agreed that 23 of the 32 Columns would not be updated,
while nine would be updated as additional monthly financial results became
available. (See II 7 of the Stipulation, R. 4573-74) For example, the parties agreed
that an adjustment would be made for "Antitrust-General Dynamics" in an
amount set forth in Column 3, which would not be updated. (R. 4573, 4581)

Clearly, under paragraph 13, the parties had "expressly agreed" (1) to the
propriety of the adjustment and (2) to the amount of the adjustment. Therefore,

the parties were precluded under paragraph 13 from appealing that issue,

assuming the adjustment was made in the amount to which the parties agreed.
On the other hand, Column G contained an adjustment for "Directory
Imputation." (R. 4582) In this case, however, the parties agreed that it would be

updated. (R. 4573-74) The propriety of the adjustment was expressly agreed to by
the parties, while the amount of the adjustment was not. Thus, under paragraph
13, the inclusion of a Directory Imputation adjustment in the Commission's final

order could not be appealed. However, since the final amount of the adjustment
was subject to update, the possibility for dispute existed as to the amount of the

adjustment. Had such a dispute occurred, it would first have been presented to
the Commission for resolution and perhaps later to this Court. It would be

grossly unreasonable to read paragraph 13 to preclude an appeal of the amount of

the "Directory Imputation" adjustment since that amount cannot reasonably be
construed to have been "expressly agreed" to by the parties.

It would be an even greater injustice to read paragraph 13 to preclude
8

USWC's appeal of the normalization issues. The very nature of the normalization
adjustments were such that they would be difficult, if not impossible, to identify

and quantify until after the Stipulation was entered.9 In this case, the Stipulation
was entered in October and most of the bookings that USWC proposed to

normalize from the test period were made in November and December. It is

absurd to argue that these issues were fully resolved—i.e., "expressly agreed
to"—in the Stipulation.
IV.

RESPONDENTS' CLAIM THAT USWC'S FAILURE TO WITHDRAW
FROM THE STIPULATION MAKES THE COMMISSION'S
INTERPRETATION BINDING IS ILLOGICAL AND WITHOUT MERIT.

Section II of Respondents' Brief (pages 17-18) is a string of non sequiturs.

The ultimate point that Respondents appear to be making is that USWC's failure
to withdraw from the Stipulation somehow transforms the Commission's

interpretation into stone. Respondents' logic goes something like this:
(1) Paragraph 12 allows a party to withdraw if the Stipulation is not
accepted in its entirety. Resp. Brief at 17.
(2) USWC could have claimed that the Commission's interpretation of the

Stipulation to not allow normalization adjustments was a failure to accept

9

The Division's position was the same.

In argument, the Division's

counsel stated:

It was our view in reading the stipulation that a decision had to be made as
to how to deal with those actual results of operation. So we took the terms of

the stipulation being that as actual results occurred from June on, that
decisions would have to be made as to whether or not abnormal events

occurring within those six months that fit within the similarities of the first
six months should be removed. (R. 3551)
9

the Stipulation in its entirety.10 Id.

(3) The Commission gave USWC the opportunity to withdraw. Id. at 18.
(4) Having failed to withdraw, USWC is bound by the Commission's
interpretation. Id.
The argument is factually illogical and unsupported by any legal analysis.
First, the Commission accepted the Stipulation in its entirety on January 3,
1991. (R. 4654-56)

Second, the statement that the Commission gave USWC every opportunity
to withdraw is simply incorrect. The only evidence cited for that claim were

questions asked by two individual commissioners at the May 15, 1991 hearing on
the normalization issues. The questions generally asked whether the parties
continued to recommend the Stipulation. (R. 3502-06) All parties took the position

that the Stipulation still existed. Id.

The Commission never took any action that

would allow any party to withdraw.n

Third, the conclusion that USWC could have withdrawn at the May 15

hearing is premised on the assumption that USWC knew at the time of that

hearing that the Commission would interpret the Stipulation to preclude the
normalization adjustments. However, the Commission's rejection of USWC's
interpretation did not become known until June 19, when the Commission issued

its final order. Thus, under Respondents' logic, USWC should have somehow

10 Respondents' were quick to note that there is a serious question whether
USWC really had the right to withdraw under those circumstances. Id. at 17.
1 1 Questions asked by individual commissioners do not constitute
Commission action. Utah Code Ann. § 54-1-3(1).
10

known on May 15 that over a month later its normalization argument would be

rejected, so that on May 15 it would have concluded "that the Commission's
interpretation of the Stipulation was a failure to accept it in its entirety and
withdraw from it." Id. at 17. How such a feat of prestidigitation would have been
achieved is left unexplained.

On May 15, USWC took the same position that it takes today: that the

Stipulation is valid and that it explicitly allows adjustments to normalize the
updated information. Given that position, it would be entirely inappropriate for
USWC to have withdrawn from what it considered to be a valid and enforceable

Stipulation. There is nothing in the Stipulation or in anything else cited by
Respondents that compels their conclusion that USWC's failure to withdraw from
the Stipulation forces the Court to adopt the Commission's interpretation.
Another point made by Respondents bears further discussion. They
criticize USWC for asking that the Commission remand this case to consider only

the normalization adjustments proposed by USWC. Id. at 18. The reason USWC
made that request is that they are the only normalization adjustments that were

proposed. Nevertheless, in the interests of fairness and equity, USWC has no
objection to the consideration of other normalization adjustments on remand, so
long as they are truly normalization adjustments, as appropriately defined.12
V.

DESPITE RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENTS TO THE CONTRARY, THE
COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATION DOES NOT HARMONIZE THE
PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACT.

Respondents make several arguments in support of their claim that the

12 See USWC's initial Brief at 30-34 for the definition of "normalization" in

the context of utility ratemaking.
11

Commission's interpretation of the Stipulation is correct. For example, they
claim that the Commission's decision harmonizes several elements of the

Stipulation, including the language relating to normalization. Amazingly,
Respondents reach that conclusion without so much as even considering a

definition of the term "modernization." In its opening brief, USWC presented a
detailed analysis of the meaning of that term in the context of utility regulation.
USWC Brief at 30-34. Respondents neither commented on nor disputed that
analysis. Yet, despite the fact that "normalization" clearly refers to the removal of

accounting entries that are unrelated to the test year, Respondents blithely

conclude that the Commission's interpretation allows it to ignore the propesed
adjustments. In so doing, Respondents ignore the requirement that the entire
agreement be given effect. Minshew v. Chevron Oil Co., 575 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah
1978).

In reaching their unsupported conclusion, Respondents make four points
that bear further discussion.

A.

Purpose of Stipulation—Representative Test Period. Respondents

are highly critical of USWC's argument that the Commission's interpretation
fails to take into account the purpose of the Stipulation, which was to create a

representative test period. Respondents condemn this argument, stating that
"nowhere in the Stipulation do the parties state that mimicking a representative
test period is the purpose of the stipulation." Resp. Brief at 20, n. 40. While that is

true, it misses the point — the Stipulation did not need to say it, because the law
requires that the Commission establish rates, whether by Stipulation or full
litigation, on the basis of a representative test period. The Commission itself has
12

defined the purpose of a test period this way:

The purpose of a test year, or test period, is to provide revenue, expense and
investment information that reasonably approximates circumstances

expected during the period rates will be in effectIn re Mountain Fuel Supply, supra, at 6, emphasis added. This statement is

consistent with the general law throughout the country that a test period be

constructed to represent, as closely as possible, the conditions in effect during the
time rates are in effect.13

The Stipulation did not need to state that a

representative test period was one of its purposes. Indeed, the normalization
concept is used in utility ratemaking to achieve that purpose.

In fulfilling its charge to act in the public interest, the Commission must
create a reasonable balance between the interests of ratepayers and the utility.
Garkane Power Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1196, 1207 (Utah 1984). In

so doing, the Commission should have interpreted the Stipulation consistent with
its actions in past rates cases, in which it has consistently removed accounting
entries that are unrepresentative of normal, ongoing operations. (R. 8326-28)
Instead, the Commission's interpretation of the Stipulation is foreign to the
normal rate case treatment of these kinds of bookings-had the case been fully

litigated, it is likely that these bookings would have been removed from the test

period. The Court should recall that the Stipulation was encouraged by the
Commission Chairman, not for the purpose of short circuiting the process and

13 McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co.. 272 U.S. 400, 408-09 (1926); West
Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n. 294 U.S. 79, 81-82 (1935); Mountain

States Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Public Utility Comm'n, 513 P.2d 721,
724-25 (Colo. 1973); Southern New- England Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities
Comm'n. 282 A.2d 915, 918-19 (Conn. Superior Ct. 1970); Central Louisiana
Electric Co. v. Louisiana Public Serv. Comm'n. 508 So. 2d 1361, 1369 (La. 1987).

See also, Utah Dept. of Bus. Reg, v. Public Sen-. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986).
13

producing a result foreign to normal practice, but to avoid litigious proceedings
and produce a result that was reasonable and consistent with the legal
requirement that rates be based on a representative test period.

B.

Additional Columns. Respondents criticize USWC's interpretation of

the Stipulation because "[i]t does not account for why the parties would go to the

trouble to restrict updates to some columns while leaving open the possibility of

adding innumerable additional columns." Resp. Brief at 21. The response to that
claim is simple. As to certain columns, the parties had adequate data to both
identify the adjustment and to quantify the amount. These are the columns the

parties agreed to resolve without further updates. Other adjustments were
identified but were left open because additional financial results were needed in

order to determine the appropriate amount of the adjustment. This structure is

completely consistent with the possibility of additional columns being added for
items that needed to be "normalized." One must always remember that the

original Stipulation was based on information for six months. Given that fact, it
is totally consistent to leave open the opportunity for parties to raise
"normalization" adjustments that would cause additional columns to be added. 14

Furthermore, the language of the Stipulation supports the addition of new

columns. In paragraph 5, the parties agreed that "fflor illustrative purposes, the

14 Respondents' inference that additional columns could be "innumerable"

is disingenuous.

Clearly they would not, since any additional columns would

need to meet the definition of a "normalization" adjustment. As correctly defined,
this kind of adjustment relates only to a very narrow kind of booking that is
unrelated to the test period. The reference to USWC's statement that there are
hundreds of potential issues is also disingenuous. While there are hundreds of
possible revenue requirement issues in a rate case, there are not hundreds of
possible "normalization" issues.
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parties have calculated JE-1 using six months actual results which have been
annualized and normalized. . . ." Had the parties intended to be tied to only the

columns in the original JE-1, then the phrase "for illustrative purposes" is
meaningless.

C.

Definition of "Consistent With". Respondents criticize USWC for

reading the term "consistent with" too broadly. Resp. Brief at 22. Their argument

(which is extremely vague) seems to be that the term "consistent with" must be
read to mean something like "identical to." However, in order for "normalization"

to have meaning in the Stipulation, the term "consistent with" must be interpreted
as USWC proposes. Respondents' interpretation eliminates the possibility of new
normalization adjustments. One can only ask why, if it means that no new

adjustments can be proposed, there was any reference to the need to normalize
the updated data.

Respondents' interpretation of the phrase "consistent with" is completely at
odds with the case law interpreting that phrase. Roanoke Memorial Hospitals v.
Kenley. 352 S.E.2d 525 (Va. App. 1987), involved an administrative decision to

allow a hospital to add a radiation therapy service over the objection of Roanoke
Memorial, a competing hospital. Roanoke Memorial argued that before the
administrative agency could authorize another radiology service, a state statute

required a finding that it would be "consistent with" the State Health Plan. Like
Respondents argue in this case, Roanoke Memorial argued for a narrow reading
of the term "consistent with."

The Court rejected the narrow reading:

Roanoke Memorial also claims that the words "consistent with" as used in

Code § 32.1-102.3(A) contradicts any notion of flexibility, and demands that
the Commissioner's ruling accord exactly with the requirements of the
15

Code. We believe that "consistent with" as used in the context of the statute

does not mean "exactly alike" or "the same in every detail." It means
instead, "in harmony writh," "compatible wfith," "holding to the same
principles." or "in general agreement wfith."
Id. at 529, emphasis added.15 While Respondents claim the Commission's order
harmonizes all the terms, their interpretation of the term "consistent with" is so
narrow that it renders the "normalization" language meaningless. USWC's
interpretation of the stipulation is the only one that harmonizes its various

provisions. USWC's "normalization" adjustments are in harmony with and hold
to the same principles as the normalization adjustments in the original JE-1.16
D.

Settlement of All Revenue Requirement Issues. Finally,

Respondents criticize LISWC's interpretation on the ground that u[i]t is
inconsistent with the expressed intention of the parties to resolve and settle all
issues relating to revenue requirement in their entirety." Resp. Brief at 22.

Perhaps the Stipulation could have been more artfully phrased, since the
Stipulation obviously did not resolve each and every revenue requirement issue. It

did resolve 23 specific issues (those which were identified and which all parties

agreed not to update). With regard to nine other issues, adjustments were agreed
to but the parties also agreed to update the amount of the adjustment. The parties

15 Sec also. Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco. Inc.. 792 F.2d 887. 891 (9th
Cir. 1986) (consistency with National Contingency Plan does not necessitate strict

compliance with its provisions "so long as the response measures promote the
broader purposes of the plan"); NL Industries v. Kaplan. 792 F.2d 896, 898-99 (9th

Cir. 1986); Channel Master Satellite v. JKI) Electronics Corp.. 748 F.Supp. 273, 383
(E.D.N.C. 1990).

J6 At lease two normalization adjustments were made in the original JE-1:

Prior Period SNFA (Column 2) and Prior Period Independent Company
Settlement (Column 5).
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also agreed that normalization adjustments consistent with adjustments in the
Stipulation could be made. Therefore, the statement that all issues were resolved
was an overstatement. The Stipulation could more accurately have stated that a
mechanism for resolving all issues had been agreed to by the parties. To the
extent a conflict exists between the general statement that all issues were being

resolved and the specific provisions that JE-1 would be updated and normalized,

the latter prevail under the rule of construction that as between general and
specific provisions, the specific provisions prevail. Bradv v. Black Mountain
Investment. 459 P.2d 712, 714 (Ariz. 1969); Norman v. Recreation Centers, 752 P.2d

514, 517 (Ariz. App. 1988); Desbicn v. Penokee Farmers Union. 552 P.2d 917, 923
(Kan. 1976); Waterway Terminals v. P.S. Lord Mechanical. 406 P.2d 556, 567 (Ore.
1964). Respondents argument is illogical and inconsistent with the language of
the Stipulation.

ARGUMENT - MODERNIZATION ISSUES

Most of Respondents' argument on modernization issues are unresponsive

to the arguments made by USWC in its initial brief. Respondents have failed to
adequately address the fundamental problem with the Commission's order: the
lack of adequate findings. For example, Respondents go on at great length in

attempting to demonstrate that the record supports the Commission order, yet fail
to deal meaningfully with the holding that "[ajbsent adequate findings, a
petitioner wishing to challenge an agency's factual findings will not be able to
marshal the evidence . . ." Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 8 (Utah App.

1991). The Commission's belief that it should be exempt from the requirement
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that it make detailed factual findings is completely inconsistent with the
pronouncements of this Court.

Rather than a point by point refutation of Respondents' arguments, USWC
will hereafter focus on the key issues relating to modernization.
I.

RESPONDENTS' STATUTORY AUTHORITY ARGUMENT IS A STRAW
MAN.

Respondents argued at length for the general proposition that the

Commission has the statutory authority to order a utility to modernize its

facilities. Resp. Brief at 34-36. While Respondents focused at length on this issue,
they failed to note that this is not a proposition that USWC opposes. USWC has

never taken the position that the Commission lacks authority to order a utility,
under appropriate circumstances, to modernize or upgrade utility facilities.
Therefore, Respondents' argument is a straw man.

Respondents criticized USWC for citing Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-7 (1992) as

the only source for the Commission's authority for the modernization order.

Resp. Brief at 35. Respondents argue that several other statutory provisions
support a claim that the Commission can order upgrades. USWC does not

dispute that there is more than one statutory provision granting the Commission
some measure of authority over utility facilities. However, the reason USWC cited

section 54-4-7 is that it is that section that focuses on the issue of adequacy of
service, which is the specific basis on which the Commission ordered the

modernization. The central Commission finding supporting modernization was

the finding "that service to certain customer areas is not adequate by preserit day
standards and that the modernization program is necessary at this time to
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provide all customers in this state with adequate and convenient service." (R. 545960, emphasis added) Thus, while Respondents are critical of USWC's failure to
cite other statutes, they fail to recognize that USWC was not excluding other

statutes as a source of Commission authority.17

Certainly, with a record and

findings that are legally sufficient, the Commission can order a utility to upgrade
service. However, as noted in USWC's initial brief and as discussed below, the

problem with the Commission's order was that the findings are legally
insufficient and, therefore, it is impossible on review to determine if there was an
adequate record.
II.

NOTWITHSTANDING COMMISSION STATEMENTS TO THE

CONTRARY, THE COMMISSION MUST MAKE DETAILED AND
EXPLICIT FINDINGS BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE
RECORD IN ORDER FOR ITS DECISION TO BE REVIEWABLE. AS A

MATTER OF LAW, THE COMMISSION FAILED TO DO SO IN THIS
CASE.

The fundamental issue with regard to the central office upgrade issue is

the question of the adequacy of the Commission's findings of fact.18 In its initial
brief, USWC pointed out that the Commission's findings are set forth in bold print
in the order. USWC Brief at 40, n. 29 Furthermore, based on a line of Utah cases,

USWC pointed out that the Commission's findings were legally inadequate in

several respects. In an effort to blunt the same argument raised by USWC in its
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In its brief, USWC stated that "[wjhile the Commission does not

explicitly so state, it appears that these findings of 'inadequacy' are premised on
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-7

"

USWC Brief at 41, emphasis added. USWC stands

by its position that, given the Commission's finding regarding adequacy of
service, section 54-4-7 was the provision primarily relied upon by the Commission.
18 Adequacy of findings is also a key issue with regard to the fiber backbone
and educational network findings as well. However, there is also a significant
due process issue relating to those two issues.
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Petition for Rehearing, the Commission, in its Order on Rehearing, attempted to
justify its lack of specific findings:

All of the discussion in the report and order should be considered findings.
The Commission is not a Court of law. We do not evaluate issues in the way
a Court would. We do not take and consider evidence in the same way. It is
true that we have quasi-judicial functions, but as an administrative arm of
the Legislature, we also have quasi-legislative and on-going administrative
responsibilities. We do not have the luxury of deciding a case and having
done with it. That means that public policy concerns, informed judgment
and forecasting always play a part in our determinations. We intend by
this to draw attention to the fact that our orders are not going to be precisely
like a Court's orders. The discussion portion of our orders is important as
it relates to the conclusions we reach, i.e. contains support for our findings
and conclusions. So-called "findings" are bolded for convenience of parties.
not because they constitute the only relevant parts of an order. If the
Legislature intends that we operate as a court and that our orders be
constructed like a court's in all respects, then it must alter the way utilities
are regulated.
(R. 5705, emphasis added). The basic points made by the Commission in this
statement are the following:
All of the discussion section in the Report and Order should be
considered findings.

Because the Commission has both judicial and quasi-legislative
functions, it does not have the luxury of deciding a case and being
done with it. Therefore, Commission orders are not going to be
precisely like the order of a court.

The discussion portion of orders contain support for findings and
conclusions. The so-called findings are placed in bold print for the
convenience of the parties, but are not the only relevant parts of an
order.

If the legislature intended that the Commission operate like a court,
then there must be an alteration in the way utilities are regulated.
There are two major problems with this line of reasoning.
First, the after-the-fact statement that the entire discussion section in the

'A)

Report and Order should be considered findings is totally inconsistent with the
requirements of the cases cited by USWC in its initial brief. Throughout the
Order, the discussion section is commonly a general review of competing evidence

provided by the parties, without any differentiation as to those portions the
Commission found to be true and those that were rejected. Only the portions of

the Order in bold print contain words that indicate that they are the "findings" of
the Commission. In Adams, supra, the Court of Appeals specifically addressed
the issue whether this kind of approach will render the findings adequate. The
Adams Court noted that the order being reviewed contained "an informative

summary of the evidence presented," but held that "a rehearsal of contradictory
evidence does not constitute findings of fact," and that "[w]hen multiple

conflicting versions of the facts create a matrix of possible factual findings, we are
unable on appeal to assume that any given finding was in fact made." Id. at 6, 7.
Thus, denoting the discussion section as part of the findings of fact is not
sufficient to meet the standard for adequate factual findings, since it is still

impossible to determine the particular facts that the Commission found to be true.
Second, the Commission noted that it operates both in a legislative and

judicial mode. While that is certainly true, it does not relieve the Commission of
the obligation, when it is operating in a judicial mode, of making factual findings
that meet the standards of a long line of Utah cases.

Mountain States Legal

Foundation v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 636 P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981); Milne Truck
Lines. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 1373 (Utah 1986); Adams, supra:

Nvrehn v. Industrial Comm'n. 800 P.2d 330 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied. 815

P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). All of these cases involve appeals from administrative
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decisions. Two of them were appeals from decisions of the Commission. The

standards enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals make
it clear that, in issuing an order based on evidence in the record, the Commission
must make clear and explicit findings.
A brief review of the key language from those decisions demonstrates these
points. In Mountain States Legal Foundation, the Court stated that "[i]t is not the

prerogative of this Court to search the record to determine whether findings could
have been made by the Commission to support its order, for to do so would be to

usurp the function with which the Commission is charged."

636 P.2d at 1052. In

Milne Truck Lines, this Court stated that

[ilt is also essential that the Commission make subsidiary findings io.
sufficient detail that the critical subordinate factual issues are highlighted

and resolved in such a fashion as to demonstrate that there is a logical and
legal basis for the ultimate conclusions. The importance of complete,
accurate and consistent findings of fact is essential to a proper
determination by an administrative agency.

720 P.2d at 1378, emphasis added. In Nvrehn. the Court of Appeals stated that
"material findings . . . may not be implied." 800 P.2d at 335 In Adams, the Court

of Appeals stated that "[wjithout the safeguard of adequate findings, there is no
guarantee that the agency followed a logical process in reaching its decision." 821

P.2d at 8. The Adams court also stated that "[a]bsent adequate findings, a
petitioner wishing to challenge an agency's factual findings will not be able to
marshal the evidence in support of the findings . . . [n]or will a petitioner be able

to challenge the agency's undeclared interpretation of law or its undisclosed logic.
. . ." Id. From its statements in the Order on Review, the Commission apparently
takes the position that these standards should not apply to it. Nevertheless, those
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are the standards that apply to the Commission. The underlying basis for these
requirements is rooted in due process. Due process requires that an

administrative agency be clear and explicit as to the specific facts upon which it is

basing its decisions. Without such findings, petitioners like USWC will be faced
with the impossible task of responding to an order where the specific factual basis
is never disclosed except that it is somewhere in the discussion section of the
order. That does not meet the standard that this Court has consistently reiterated

and it is not the standard that should be adopted today. The Commission, like all

other administrative agencies in this state, must make detailed and sufficient

factual findings in order for a petitioner to have a meaningful opportunity for
review. The Commission has failed, as a matter of law, to meet these standards in
this case.

III.

RESPONDENT FAILED TO RESPOND TO USWC'S ARGUMENT

REGARDING STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING ADEQUACY OF
SERVICE.

In its initial Brief, USWC advanced an argument that the Commission's

order was deficient in failing to define "present day standards" and "present day
service expectations." USWC Brief at 46-48. This is a significant argument since
the failure to define such terms on the basis of evidence on the record makes it

impossible to determine whether "the agency followed a logical process in

reaching its decision" or to "be able to challenge the agency's undeclared
interpretation of the law or its undisclosed logic." Adams, 821 P.2d at 8.
Respondents failed to respond to this argument in their brief.

23

IV.

RESPONDENTS' DUE PROCESS ARGUMENT IGNORES THE
STANDARDS SET FORTH IN THE RELEVANT CASE LAW.

USWC asserts that the Commission violated USWC's due process right in
ordering it to complete the fiber backbone and educational network, even without
an incentive regulation plan, when no party proposed such a result in the hearing
below.

Respondents argue that the requirements of due process were met in this
case because USWC participated in the proceeding, enthusiastically supported the

modernization plan, and there was testimony from witnesses supporting the

plan.

Respondents do not even address the fact that the Commission specifically

required that the parties provide notice if they were going to seek a mandated

modernization plan, in the absence of an incentive plan. (R. 3935) Nor do
Respondents respond to the fact that no party proposed that the Commission order

the fiber backbone or educational network, with or without an incentive plan. In
fact, the Division and Committee actively opposed such an order. Despite their
position below, they now assert that there was adequate notice.

Respondents did not respond to or otherwise challenge the case law cited by
USWC that holds that, in order for due process requirements to be met, "a

'hearing' must be prefaced by timely notice which adequately informs the parties
of the specific issues they must prepare to meet"*9 and that due process requires
"a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet

them." Morgan v. United States. 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938). Respondents also failed to
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Nelson v. Jacohsen. 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983), quoting State v.

Gibbs. 500 P.2d 209, 215 (Ida. 1972).
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respond to the cases that hold that a decision must respond to "issues framed by
the pleadings," and that a trier of fact "has no authority to render a decision on
issues not presented for determination." Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns,
680 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1984).

Respondents' reference to Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill. 470 U.S.
532 (1985) is incomplete. While they relied on the statement that w[t]he essential

requirements of due process . . . are notice and an opportunity to respond," they
ignored the next sentence: " The opportunity to present reasons, either in person
or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental due

process requirement." Id. at 546, emphasis added. There was no proposal by any
party that the fiber backbone or educational network be ordered in the absence of
an incentive plan. Thus, there was no "proposed action" to which USWC could
respond. Therefore, an order requiring such an action is a direct violation of
USWC's due process rights.
CONCLUSION

On the basis of USWC's initial brief and the foregoing Reply Brief, USWC

hereby requests that the Court grant USWC the relief prayed for in the initial
Brief.
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